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MATERNAL WALL DISCRIMINATION:
EVIDENCE REQUIRED FOR LITIGATION
AND COST-EFFECTIVE SOLUTIONS
FOR A FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE
Claire-Therese D. Luceno*
I. INTRODUCTION
Women are an ever-increasing presence in the American workforce.
Between 1969 and 1998, the number of married women in the labor force
nearly doubled, and the number of married women with children under the
age of three in the labor force increased nearly threefold.1 By 2002,
seventy-two percent of mothers with children aged one and older were in
the labor force.2 The American workplace has failed to keep pace with this
development, and as a result, incidences of "maternal wall" discrimination
and resulting lawsuits have increased, with a trend toward costly
settlements and findings for the plaintiff. The "maternal wall," discussed in
greater detail below, refers to discrimination against working mothers or
other caregivers.3
This article discusses the maternal wall within the context of the prima
facie employment discrimination case, the effectiveness of the uses of
comparator and stereotyping evidence, litigation trends in maternal wall
cases, and the impact of flexible policies on the workplace. Part II
introduces the concepts of the "maternal wall" and the prima facie
employment discrimination case. Part III discusses the use of comparator
. J.D. Candidate, University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2007; Bachelor of Business
Administration, magna cum laude, Loyola Marymount University, 2004. This article was originally
written as a paper for a seminar taught by Distinguished Professor Joan C. Williams of the Center for
WorkLife Law, U.C. Hastings College of the Law.
1. Debbie M. Kaminer, The Work-Family Conflict: Developing a Model of Parental Accommodation
in the Workplace, 54 AM. U. L. REv. 305, 310 (2004).
2. Id.
3. Amanda Cuda, Maternal Wall, CONN. POST, Feb. 26, 2005, at Lifestyle (reporting that women are
disproportionately impacted by maternal wall discrimination since women still do 65-80% of child-care
work and over 60% of elder care in the household). But see Knussman v. Maryland, 272 F.3d 625, 636-
37 (4th Cir. 2001) (discussing discrimination against male caregivers).
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evidence and stereotyping evidence in maternal wall cases and concludes,
based on two factors, that in such cases courts should accept stereotyping
evidence instead of exclusively requiring comparator evidence. First,
because the U.S. economy is highly sex segregated, many women who
have experienced gender discrimination will nevertheless be unable to
produce a comparator: evidence of a similarly situated male may well be
impossible to find because the plaintiff is in a workplace where her job is
not held by any men.4 Using stereotyping evidence avoids this problem. It
also reflects recent developments in social science. Recent social science
studies show that motherhood is a key trigger for gender bias and gender
stereotyping, which suggests that stereotyping evidence offers reliable
proof of maternal wall bias.5 Part III nonetheless discusses both the use of
comparator and stereotyping evidence, given that some courts still require
evidence of a comparator.6 Part V provides businesses with important
guidance on the need to avoid maternal wall lawsuits and a business-based
model for making the workplace more family-friendly while improving
competitiveness.
II. THE MATERNAL WALL DEFINED AND THE PRIMA FACIE
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION CASE
A. WHAT IS THE "MATERNAL WALL"?
In seeking desired employment, women in general are disadvantaged
by a sex-based, invisible barrier known as the "glass ceiling."7 But there is
an additional invisible barrier excluding women from desirable
employment called the "maternal wall," defined as discrimination against
working mothers or other caregivers.' An example of such discrimination
is one employer's view that "'serious' business people cannot be
interrupted with 'home matters' during their work hours," and that the ideal
worker is one who is "wholly unencumbered by life outside of work."9 In
Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., the employer
developed job hiring profiles to exclude married women with and without
children. 0 Women may hit the maternal wall by announcing pregnancy
4. JOAN C. WILLIAMS, UNBENDING GENDER: WHY FAMILY AND WORK CONFLICT AND WHAT TO DO
ABOUT IT 66 (2001).
5. Joan C. Williams, Monica Biernat & Faye Crosby, The Maternal Wall: Research and Policy
Perspectives on Discrimination Against Mothers, 60 J. OF SOC. ISSUES (SPECIAL ISSUE) 667 passim
(2004).
6. Ernest F. Lidge III, The Courts' Misuse of the Similarly Situated Concept in Employment
Discrimination Law, 67 MO. L. REV. 831, 832 (2002).
7. Christine Jolls, Is There a Glass Ceiling?, 25 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 1 (2002).
8. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 70.
9. Jolls, supra note 7, at 2.
10. Santiago-Ramos v. Centennial P.R. Wireless Corp., 217 F.3d 46, 51 (lst Cir. 2000) (rejecting
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and the intention to take maternity leave11 or by asking for a part-time or
flextime work schedule, 2 and they may find that, because of such
announcements or requests, they are kept out of desirable jobs or may lose
the positions they already hold. 3
B. THE BASIS FOR THE MATERNAL WALL
Maternal wall discrimination is generally based on the stereotype that
a woman's responsibilities to her children prevent her from being a reliable
and competent employee. 4 For example, a common stereotype is the
association between motherhood and incompetence. 5 Mothers are often
thought of as "nice" and nurturing, but as workers they are often assumed
to be less-than-competent. 16 This particular stereotypical association is so
strong that subjects in a study rated businesswomen as close in competence
to businessmen and millionaires, but rated housewives very low in
competence, along with the "elderly," "blind," "retarded," and
"disabled"--stigmatized words used intentionally by the researchers who
conducted the study. 7 Another study showed that working men are held to
lower standards of time commitment and competence, while working
women are held to higher standards of time commitment and must prove
their competence repeatedly.'8
Mothers are also assumed to be less reliable than other workers. 19
Employers may assume that women who have children may no longer be
able to focus their time and attention on work. As a result, women may be
passed over for promotions, be assigned less prestigious work, or even
receive lower pay. In one case, the plaintiff was not considered for a
defendant employer's preference for hiring unmarried, childless women, who the employer reasoned
would "give 150% to the job," where defendant employer's hiring profile purportedly excluded older
persons with heavy non-work commitments, married women, and women with children).
11. Quaranta v. Mgmt. Support, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1043 (D. Ariz. 2003).
12. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 314.
13. Cuda, supra note 3, at Lifestyle.
14. Martha Chamallas, Mothers and Disparate Treatment: The Ghost of Martin Marietta, 44 VILL.
L. REv. 337, 340 (1999).
15. Peter Glick & Susan T. Fiske, Ambivalent Sexism, in 33 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOL. 115, 170 (Mark P. Zanna ed., 2001).
16. Joan C. Williams, The Social Psychology of Stereotyping: Using Social Science to Litigate
Gender Discrimination Cases and Defang the "Cluelessness " Defense, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J.
401, 429 (2003).
17. Susan T. Fiske et. al., A Model of (Often Mixed) Stereotype Content: Competence and Warmth
Respectively Follow from Perceived Status and Competition, 82 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
878, 881, 887 (2002).
18. Williams, supra note 16, at 413 (citing Martha Foschi, Double Standards for Competence:
Theory and Research, 26 ANN. REv. Soc. 21, 29 (2000); Cecilia Ridgeway, Gender, Status, and
Leadership, 57 J. SOC. ISSUES 637 (2001)).
19. Kathleen Feugen, et al., Mothers and Fathers in the Workplace: How Gender and Parental
Status Influence Judgments of Job-Related Competence, 60 J. OF SOC. ISSUES 737, 748 (2004).
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promotion because her employer assumed she would not be interested in
the position since it entailed travel, and she had children.20
In part because these stereotypes have long been engrained in
American culture, the American workplace has failed to keep pace with an
important recent development: the increase in the number of women in the
workforce. Within a thirty-year period, the number of married women in
the labor force nearly doubled, and the number of married women with
children under the age of three in the labor force nearly tripled.21 By 2002,
seventy-two percent of mothers with children aged one and older were in
the labor force.2 ' Despite the increase in the number of working mothers,
however, the "ideal worker" norm remains the same: the ideal worker is an
employee with no childcare responsibilities who can work at least forty
hours per week year-round, including working overtime on short notice.23
This standard is based on the "traditional" life patterns of men in the
"traditional" family in which the husband is the breadwinner and the wife
stays home as a full-time mother.24 Several identifiable employer practices
and policies that disadvantage women in the workplace are nevertheless
accepted as the norm, such as the expectation of long work hours, rigid
work schedules, limited personal leave, strict limits on absenteeism,
prolonged probation or evaluation periods, frequent or extended travel, and
the general second-class treatment of part-time employees.25  Such
practices do not disadvantage men with children in the same way, since
women remain primarily responsible for childcare, housekeeping, and elder
care. 26 Because the job market is still structured according to the "ideal
worker" standard, it is difficult for American women to succeed in the
workplace while juggling familial responsibilities because they continue to
shoulder most of the childcare and elder care responsibility in the
household.27
C. THE PRIMA FACIE CASE OF EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION AND THE
COMPARATOR REQUIREMENT
To state a claim of employment discrimination against an employer, a
plaintiff must show that the employer discriminated against her based on
20. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
1998).
21. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 310.
22. Id.
23. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 2.
24. Id.
25. Laura T. Kessler, The Attachment Gap: Employment Discrimination Law, Women's Cultural
Caregiving, and the Limits of Economic and Liberal Legal Theory, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 371, 413-
14(2001).
26. Id. at 378-79.
27. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 313-14.
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her membership in a protected class.28 Under McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, a Supreme Court case containing firmly established law followed
by all circuits, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimination
in order to prevail on such a claim.29  A plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case either by presenting direct evidence of discriminatory intent3" or
by presenting circumstantial evidence of the four elements outlined in
McDonnell Douglas: the plaintiff (1) is a member of a protected class, (2)
performed according to the employer's legitimate expectations, (3) suffered
an adverse employment action, and (4) was treated less favorably than
other employees similarly situated31, or (4) was replaced by someone
outside of the protected class.32
Under the traditional formulation of the prima facie case, the fourth
requirement is most commonly met when the plaintiff points to a similarly
situated employee, or "comparator," whom the employer treated
differently.3 3 It is worth noting, however, that the trend is toward a different
definition of the fourth element that is more favorable for plaintiffs. It is
now increasingly common for courts to require instead that the plaintiff
was rejected for an available position "under circumstances that give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination., 34 For example, in Glunt v. GES
Exposition Services, Inc., the plaintiff presented evidence of discriminatory
animus, including a supervisor's stated intention to limit the plaintiffs
travel responsibilities because of her pregnancy and derogatory remarks
calling the plaintiff "huge" and publicly exclaiming that she "waddled."35
The court found that such circumstances gave rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination and thus did not require the showing of a
comparator to prevail on her claim.36
Once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to
the defendant employer to articulate a legitimate nondiscriminatory motive
for its employment decision.37 Then the burden shifts back to the plaintiff,
who must show that the employer's stated reason is merely a pretext for a
discriminatory motive.38
28. Lidge, supra note 6, at 831.
29. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).
30. Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1220 (9th Cir. 1998).
31. Quaranta v. Mgmt. Support, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (D.Ariz. 2003).
32. Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 656 (M.D. Tenn. 1996); see also
McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Mitchell v. Toledo Hospital, 964 F.2d 577, 582 (6th Cir. 1992).
33. Lidge, supra note 6, at 832.
34. Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).
35. Glunt v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 847, 866-67 (D. Md. 2000) (finding that
employer took adverse employment actions against the plaintiff based on her pregnancy and intent to
take maternity leave).
36. Id. at 866.
37. Quaranta v. Mgmt. Support, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1045 (D. Ariz. 2003).
38. Id. Circumstantial evidence to show pretext "must be 'specific and substantial' in order to create
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While all circuits allow a plaintiff to prove a case circumstantially,
and all plaintiffs who do so use the four McDonnell Douglas prongs, the
key issue is how to define a comparator. Presenting strong, favorable
comparator evidence usually requires a plaintiff to show similarly situated
males. The problem for the female plaintiff arises when the job position in
question is one primarily dominated by women. Three-fourths of
American women who work have jobs traditionally held by women.3 9 In
the context of a maternal wall case, therefore, it may be difficult or
impossible to find a similarly situated male employee. A recent holding in
Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, solves this
problem.4" In that case, which involved a school psychologist, the court
allowed the case to go forward based on evidence of gender stereotyping
alone, without evidence of a male comparator.4'
This note explores both the traditional "comparator" approach and the
newer "stereotyping" approach. While the latter is desirable from the
viewpoint of women plaintiffs and may well represent a growing legal
trend, some courts continue to prefer the older approach of requiring
comparators. This note will help the practitioner better understand how to
frame maternal wall cases under each of the two approaches.
III. ANALYSIS
This section first discusses the complex issues related to the use of
comparators in maternal wall cases. It then discusses maternal wall cases
that abandon comparator evidence in favor of stereotyping evidence and
cases that appear to combine the two types of evidence. It concludes that,
in light of recent social science, maternal wall cases are best understood as
stereotyping cases and courts should follow the modern trend of allowing
plaintiffs to use evidence of gender stereotyping instead of insisting on
comparator evidence.
A. THE USE OF COMPARATORS IN MATERNAL WALL CASES: THE
GREATEST HURDLE FOR THE PLAINTIFF
This section discusses several issues relevant to the use of
comparators in maternal wall cases, including the problems of determining
the proper comparator, and, in strategic terms, determining the optimal
comparator from the perspectives of both the defendant employer and the
plaintiff employee. This section also discusses the issues one must
consider when showing comparator evidence at the prima facie stage of the
a triable issue with respect to whether the employer intended to discriminate on the basis of sex,"
Godwin v. Hunt Wesson, Inc., 150 F.3d 1217, 1222 (9th Cir. 1998).
39. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 66.
40. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
41. See discussion infra part III.B.2.
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employment discrimination case as opposed to at the pretext stage.
1. Who is a Proper Comparator?
If a court requires a plaintiff to provide evidence of a comparator, the
outcome of a maternal wall discrimination case often depends on how
narrowly the court defines that comparator. Courts take various
approaches.
a) Subgroup 1: Women Compared to Men, Without Reference to Children
Under the fourth prong of the McDonnell Douglas test, some circuits
require the plaintiff to show that she was replaced by someone outside the
protected class.42 In Sumner v. Wayne County, the plaintiff was a newly
hired police officer on a one-year probationary period.43 She became
pregnant and requested time off work and an extension of her probationary
period, so that upon her return she could complete her probation without
needing to start a new one-year probationary period.4' Her comparator was
a male who was similarly situated because an injury he suffered while on
duty required him to take time off from work during his probationary
period.45 Unlike the plaintiff, when the male returned to work he was
permitted to complete the remainder of his probationary period without
having to start a new probationary period.46 The court focused on whether
the employees were similar in their ability to perform their jobs, regardless
of the source of the injury or illness, and not whether the "temporary
disability" was due to an injury sustained on-duty or a pregnancy
presumably sustained off-duty. 47 Thus, where the court's inquiry is focused
on the simple question of ability or inability to perform the job in question,
the relevant comparator is a similarly situated male, irrespective of whether
or not he has children.
However, where a court defines the comparator more narrowly, a
different approach is required. In Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber
Co., the court pointed out that if the prima facie standard requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate that he or she was similarly situated in every
respect to an employee outside the protected class who received more
favorable treatment, the prima facie standard effectively removes the
plaintiff from the protective reach of anti-discrimination laws if he or she
occupies a position for which no suitable comparator exists.48 This
42. Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 657 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
43. Sumner v. Wayne County, 94 F. Supp. 2d 822, 823 (E.D. Mich. 2000).
44. Id.
45. Id. at 826.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Ercegovich v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 154 F.3d 344, 353 (6th Cir. 1998).
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situation is bound to be common, given that three-fourths of women have
jobs traditionally held by women.49 Such women often will be unable to
find a similarly situated male comparator who received more favorable
treatment than the plaintiff. Thus, the ability to present stereotyping
evidence, as discussed in Part B, is essential to these plaintiffs.
b) Subgroup 2: Women with Children Compared to Men with Children
In Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., the plaintiff successfully used "men with
children" comparator evidence to establish a disparate treatment claim."
There, because another woman received the promotion denied to the female
plaintiff, the employer argued that the plaintiff could not prove
discrimination on the basis of sex.51 The plaintiff alleged however, that
before hiring the woman, who had no children, the employer first
approached two men, both with children, about the promotion in question.
The plaintiff also alleged that many of the men promoted to the position in
question had children. 3 The judge remarked that even if the promotion of
a childless woman was insufficient to establish the fourth prong of the
prima facie case, the comparator evidence provided by the plaintiff was
sufficient to establish "circumstances giving rise to an inference of
unlawful discrimination.,
54
This holding means that in circuits that recognize men with children as
appropriate comparators in maternal wall cases, a plaintiff is more likely to
succeed in establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, especially
when the plaintiff can prove favorable treatment of fathers over mothers.
The most likely explanation for the more favorable treatment of fathers
than mothers is that employers are more likely to assume that primary
caregiving responsibilities fall on women rather than men.5
c) Subgroup 3: Women with Children Compared to Women Without
Children
Replacement by someone who is still within the protected class is a
factor that may hurt the plaintiffs claim. 6 Thus the employer in Trezza
promoted a childless woman following its refusal to promote a mother.57
49. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 66.
50. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
1998).
51. Id. at 14-15.
52. Id. at 19-20.
53. Id. at 20.
54. Id.
55. Kessler, supra note 25, at 378.
56. Fuller v. GTE Corp./Contel Cellular, 926 F. Supp. 653, 657 (M.D. Tenn. 1996).
57. Trezza, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, at *15.
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However, the judge dismissed this argument as being "without merit."58 It
is important to note that Trezza was a "sex-plus" discrimination case.59 In
sex plus cases, the plaintiff argues that she has been subjected to disparate
treatment based not solely on sex, but on sex "considered in conjunction
with a second characteristic."6  When a plaintiffs disparate treatment
claim rests on sex-plus discrimination, the employer's decision to hire
someone of the same sex but without the added characteristic clearly is
inadequate to defeat an otherwise legitimate inference of discrimination.6'
2. Various Considerations When Using Comparator Evidence at Different
Stages in Litigating Maternal Wall Cases
a) The Comparator at the Prima Facie Stage: A Possible Barrier for the
Plaintiff's Case
(1) Requirement Creates Unnecessary Limitations on Potential
Comparators
The four elements of the prima facie case were established to force the
parties and the court to focus on the employer's true motivation for the
62 rm or a adta h
alleged discriminatory action. The Supreme Court has said that the
plaintiffs burden at this stage is "not onerous,"63 and the requirements for
the prima facie case "[were] never intended to be rigid, mechanized, or
ritualistic. Rather, it is merely a sensible, orderly way to evaluate the
evidence in light of common experience as it bears on the critical question
of discrimination." 64
However, to make out a prima facie case, some courts have required
the plaintiff to introduce a comparator who is not a member of the
protected class. The requirement of showing a "similarly situated"
comparator becomes problematic when courts focus their attention on
"fine, sometimes irrelevant," distinctions among employees.65 If courts
adopt a narrow definition of "similarly situated," such that trivial
distinctions prevent the plaintiff from presenting other potential
comparators, plaintiffs will find it far more difficult to prove a prima facie
case of discrimination. Finding a male comparator is particularly difficult
in maternal wall cases in light of the observation that three-fourths of
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at *16 (citing Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1433 (2d Cir. 1995)).
61. Id. at *17-18.
62. Lidge, supra note 6, at 855.
63. Tex. Dep't. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 n.8 (1981).
64. Fumco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
65. Lidge, supra note 6, at 855-56.
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women work in jobs predominantly held by women."
(2) Requirement is Inconsistent with U.S. Supreme Court and Statutory
Law
Requiring plaintiffs to show comparator evidence at the prima facie
stage also contradicts U.S. Supreme Court employment discrimination case
law, which under McDonnell Douglas allows plaintiffs to demonstrate a
prima facie case in more ways than one.67 Additionally, employment
discrimination statutes require only that the plaintiff employee prove that
she was discriminated against due to her membership in a protected
group.68 The relevant statutory language does not require a plaintiff to
show a comparator, and the Supreme Court has interpreted the statutes
accordingly. In McDonnell Douglas, the Court held that to meet the fourth
requirement of a prima facie case, the plaintiff must show only that the
employer continued to seek applicants after the employer rejected her.69 At
the pretext stage, the employee may establish that the nondiscriminatory
reasons forwarded by the employer were a mere pretext and that
discrimination was the employer's actual motivation.7" This may be
achieved either by showing a comparator or by showing how the employer
treated her in the past and how the employer generally treats employees
within the same protected group.71
In the latter context, of course, finding a comparator is unnecessary for
a successful claim of employment discrimination. And it should be
unnecessary: the American workplace remains highly sex-segregated,"
which often makes it difficult for a female plaintiff to find an appropriate
male employee comparator. Strictly requiring plaintiffs to show
comparator evidence at the prima facie stage will deny many women the
protection of the employment discrimination laws.
b) The Comparator at the Pretext Stage: A Less Onerous Burden
If a court requires comparator evidence, it is worth noting that it is less
burdensome for a plaintiff to show a comparator at the pretext stage than at
the prima facie stage. The court in Trezza found that the plaintiff was
required to compare herself to similarly situated men only at the pretext
stage.73 High courts are departing from a "rigid" application of the
66. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 66.
67. Lidge, supra note 6, at 857.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 66.
73. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, *17 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
1998).
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"similarly situated" requirement, particularly in cases where such a
requirement lacks probative value due to the existence of discriminatory
animus."
Quaranta v. Management Support illustrates a practical distinction
between introducing the comparator at the prima facie stage and
introducing the comparator at the pretext stage, which affects the plaintiff's
case going forward.75 There, the employer argued that the plaintiff must
provide evidence at the prima facie stage of similarly situated employees
who were not terminated for taking vacation time in excess of the company
policy.76 The plaintiff argued that the fourth element of the McDonnell
Douglas framework could be satisfied by showing that "her position
remained open and was ultimately filled by a non-pregnant employee.""
Due to differences between the two standards for the prima facie and the
pretext stages, the introduction of a comparator at the prima facie stage is
more of a burden for the plaintiff than at the pretext stage. If, at the prima
facie stage, the plaintiff only has to provide evidence that she was replaced
by a non-pregnant employee and not evidence of a comparator, then the
burden shifts to the employer to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for
the adverse employment action." The plaintiff can provide evidence to
show that the explanation is merely pretext, including a showing of
evidence that the policy was applied inconsistently.79
However, if the plaintiff is required to show comparator evidence at
the prima facie stage and fails to do so, the plaintiff's case fails at the prima
facie stage.8 ° This means that the plaintiff will never have the opportunity
to show that the adverse employment action was pretextual. 8' This affected
the outcome in Quaranta because the best evidence of pregnancy
discrimination presented by the plaintiff was that her employer hired and
trained a non-pregnant female employee to replace her and fired her in
contravention of its own leave policies. 2 The court ultimately held that to
make out a prima facie case, a plaintiff can show either that similarly
situated individuals were treated differently, or that she was replaced by a
nonpregnant employee.83 Thus, the plaintiff in Quaranta successfully
74. See Glunt v. GES Exposition Servs., Inc., 123 F. Supp. 2d 847, 866 (D. Md. 2000).
75. See Quaranta v. Mgmt. Support, 255 F. Supp. 2d 1040, 1047 (D. Ariz. 2006) (arguing that
employer discriminated against the plaintiff when he terminated the plaintiff and hired a non-pregnant
female employee to take over the plaintiff's position after the plaintiff requested a six-week leave to
care for her newborn).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Quaranta, 255 F. Supp. 2d at 1047.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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established a prima facie case without comparator evidence and was able to
show that the employer's articulated "nondiscriminatory" reasons for its
practice were mere pretext and not actual motive in the later pretext stage.
B. LITIGATING MATERNAL WALL DISCRIMINATION CASES
SUCCESSFULLY WITHOUT A COMPARATOR: USING
STEREOTYPING EVIDENCE
Modem social science shows that women tend to be stereotyped by
subtype, for example as mothers (or feminists or businesswomen) rather
than simply "women."84 Recent studies also show that motherhood is a key
trigger for gender stereotyping.8" Thus, social science suggests that
maternal wall cases should be viewed as gender discrimination cases rather
than sex plus cases and litigated as stereotyping cases rather than as
comparator cases.
Courts have begun to recognize the important role gender stereotypes
play in the work/family context. In Nevada Department of Human
Resources v. Hibbs, 6 the Supreme Court seemed to go out of its way to
note those stereotypes in the realm of work and family in a case involving
the interaction of the Eleventh Amendment87 and the Family and Medical
Leave Act.88 Rehnquist's majority opinion noted that "the fault line
between work and family [is] precisely where sex-based overgeneralization
has been and remains strongest." 89  He continued, "[s]tereotypes about
women's domestic responsibilities are reinforced by parallel stereotypes
presuming a lack of domestic responsibilities for men. These mutually
reinforcing stereotypes created a self-fulfilling cycle of discrimination."9
Two components of stereotypes - descriptive stereotypes and
prescriptive stereotypes - play a significant role in the context of sex
discrimination cases.9 ' The following sections outline the recent trend of
successful cases in which the plaintiffs did not present comparator
evidence, but instead relied on stereotyping evidence to prevail on their
84. Kay Deaux et al., Level of Categorization and the Content of Gender Stereotypes, 30 SOc. Coo.
145 passim (1985) (documenting that women are stereotyped by subtype); Fiske et al., supra note 17,
passim (documenting stereotyping of women as business women, housewives, etc.).
85. Williams, supra note 5, passim.
86. Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs 538 U.S. 721 (2003).
87. The Eleventh Amendment states: "The Judicial powers of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United
States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State." U.S. CONST.
amend. XI.
88. 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
89. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 at 738.
90. Id.
91. Williams, supra note 16, at 406 (citing Diana Burgess and Eugene Borgida, Who Women Are,
Who Women Should Be: Descriptive and Prescriptive Gender Stereotyping in Sex Discrimination, 5
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L. 665 (1999)).
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respective claims of maternal wall discrimination.
1. Descriptive Stereotyping: Beliefs About How Mothers Will Behave
A descriptive stereotype is a belief one has about how an individual is
presumed to behave.92 The individual is expected and assumed to behave
according to such a belief, whether or not she actually does so.93 In Trezza
v. Hartford, Inc., for example, the defendant employer assumed that the
plaintiff would not be interested in a position that entailed travel because
she had a family.9 4 The same employer told the plaintiff that if her attorney
husband won "another big verdict," she "would be sitting at home eating
bon bons."95 Such stereotyping is harmful because it assumes a lack of
commitment based on a negative gender stereotype rather than an
individual's actual behavior. The employer decided Trezza's interests and
commitment level for her, thus precluding her from more desirable
employment opportunities.
2. Prescriptive Stereotyping: Beliefs About How Mothers Should Behave
A prescriptive stereotype is an expression of one's opinion of how an
individual ought to behave.96 This form of stereotyping is common in
maternal wall cases. For example, in Bailey v. Scott-Gallaher, Inc., the
employer terminated the female plaintiff after she gave birth, stating that
her "place was at home with her child."97 The employer in Bailey made the
decision to terminate the plaintiff based on a prescriptive stereotype about
how he thought a mother should behave.
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins" is the germinal case with respect to
accepting stereotyping evidence to sustain a claim of disparate treatment
and provides a good illustration of the use of prescriptive stereotyping
evidence in a sex discrimination claim. There, the employer acknowledged
that the plaintiff had played a key role in the employer's successful effort to
secure a multi-million dollar contract with the Department of State and that
no other employee had a comparable record in securing contracts for the
firm. Nevertheless, the plaintiff was passed over for a promotion to partner
because she was deemed "macho," she "overcompensated for being a
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 28,
1998).
95. Id. at *5-6.
96. Williams, supra note 16, at 406.
97. 480 S.E.2d 502, 503 (Va. 1997).
98. 490 U.S. 228 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
(2000), as recognized in Hartwell v. Lifetime Doors, Inc., No. 05-2115, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6026, at
*17 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 16, 2006).
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woman," and she should take "a course at charm school."99 In addition, the
plaintiff was advised to "walk more femininely, talk more femininely, dress
more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and wear jewelry."' 00
The trial court, the Court of Appeals, and the U.S. Supreme Court agreed
that such remarks were based on "an impermissibly cabined view of the
proper behavior of women," and that Price Waterhouse had discriminated
against Hopkins on the basis of sex because it had weighed such remarks in
deciding not to promote her.'
Price Waterhouse was decided within the context of the glass ceiling,
and relied on the "mixed motives rationale."'0 2 The employer's decision
may have been "a result of multiple factors, at least one of which is
legitimate," 10 3 and if the employer succeeds in showing that it would have
taken the same action without the improper motive, the plaintiff cannot
recover compensatory and punitive damages.'0 4  In order to win a
substantial recovery, it is thus desirable for the plaintiff to prove that the
employer's alleged discriminatory action was based on a discriminatory
motive.
In Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free School District, the court
held that "stereotyping of women as caregivers can by itself and without
more be evidence of an impermissible, sex-based motive.' 0 5 Examples of
prescriptive stereotyping here include the employer's comments that "this
was not perhaps the job or the school district for [the plaintiff] if she had
'little ones,"' and that "it was 'not possible for [the plaintiff] to be a good
mother and have this job."", 10 6 Back was not a mixed motive analysis case;
in fact, it was a constitutional case brought under section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871.107 In addition to illustrating the successful use of
descriptive stereotyping evidence in a maternal wall case, Back is
significant for two reasons. The approach allows the many women in sex-
segregated American workplaces to contest gender discrimination even if
they lack a comparator. This in turn enables the plaintiff to litigate a
pretext case using gender stereotyping, which may result in the recovery of
greater compensatory and punitive damages.
99. Id. at 234-35.
100. Id. at 235.
101. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 236-37 (disagreeing with the lower courts on the requisite
standard of proof).
102. Id. at 260.
103. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
104. 5 ARTHUR LARSON & LEX K, LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMNATION §93.3 (2d ed. 1992).
105. Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 365 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 2004).
106. Id. at 115.
107. Id. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
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3. Stereotyping Evidence in Sex-Plus Cases
Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp. was the first case to address the
stereotypical assumption that a woman with school-aged children would be
absent from work more frequently than her male or childless female
coworkers."°8 Phillips concerned a hiring policy that excluded women with
preschool-aged children but did not exclude similarly-situated men.0 9 The
employer rebutted the plaintiffs claim by showing that while 70-75% of
those who applied for the position in question were women, 75-80% of
those holding the positions were women."0 The employer asserted that
these statistics proved that there was no bias against women."'
Phillips ultimately prevailed on a theory of sex-plus discrimination,
under which the employee experienced discrimination based on sex and a
facially neutral characteristic." 2 The United States Supreme Court held
that section 703(a) of the Civil Right Act of 1964 does not permit separate
hiring policies for male and female parents of pre-school aged children." 3
Under this rule, employers may not treat female and male employees
differently on the basis of sex plus a facially neutral characteristic, such as
parenthood." 4
As noted above, Phillips v. Martin Marietta and the sex-plus
discrimination doctrine reflect a traditional approach to maternal wall
cases. Nonetheless, because some courts may still adopt this approach, it is
worthwhile to review the use of stereotyping evidence in the context of the
sex-plus theory.
In Trezza, the plaintiff was able to provide evidence that two males
with children were approached about the promotion in question before the
childless woman was promoted." 5 The judge in that case commented that
evidence showing that the employer treated the plaintiff mother "differently
than married men or men with children" would be sufficient to give rise to
an inference of unlawful discrimination."'' 16
C. CASES WHERE PLAINTIFFS COMBINE STEREOTYPING AND
COMPARATOR EVIDENCE
In some maternal wall cases, plaintiffs have presented both
108. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542, 542 (1971); Kessler, supra note 25, at 401.
109. Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 411 F.2d 1, 2 (5th Cir. 1969), vacated, 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
110. Id.
I 11. Id.
112. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 327-28.
113. Phillips, 400 U.S. at 544.
114. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 327.
115. Trezza v. Hartford, Inc., 98 Civ. 2205, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 20206, *19-20 (S.D.N.Y. Dec.
28, 1998).
116. Id. at *20.
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comparator evidence and evidence of gender stereotyping, although courts
have tended to rely on the stereotyping rather than the comparator
evidence.
For example, the plaintiff in Moore v. Alabama State University
presented as a comparator a male employee who received a promotion she
sought." 7 Because the court did not resolve whether the plaintiff applied
for the job, or whether the male comparator himself was less qualified for
the job than the plaintiff, the plaintiffs comparator evidence did not serve
as the basis for the court's decision."1 8 Instead, the court based its decision
on direct gender stereotyping evidence, citing the employer's statements to
the plaintiff when she was pregnant ("I was going to put you in charge of
that office, but look at you now"), and his remark that a woman should stay
home with her family." 9
The stereotyping and comparator approaches also were combined in
Lust v. Sealy, Inc., where the plaintiff was denied a promotion to the "Key
Account Manager" position, which instead was filled by a person outside
the protected class, a young man. 2° There, the plaintiff provided evidence
of both glass ceiling and maternal wall discrimination by presenting
statements that the defendant employer had made to the plaintiff. For
example, the employer remarked, "Oh, isn't that just like a woman to say
something like that," and "you're being a blonde again today."'' The
employer also admitted that he did not consider the plaintiff for the
promotion in question because it required relocation and he assumed that
the plaintiff would not want to relocate her family; yet the employer
promoted a man who expressed interest in promotion, on the assumption
that he could and would move his family. 2 2  The court stressed the
stereotyping, rather than the comparator, evidence.
As noted, in both these cases the courts ultimately relied on the
evidence of stereotyping rather than on the evidence of a comparator. Thus
these cases, too, can be seen as part of the trend towards stereotyping
evidence in maternal wall cases.
117. Moore v. Ala. State Univ. 980 F. Supp. 426, 437 (M.D. Ala. 1997).
118. Id.
119. Id. at 431.
120. Lust v. Sealy, Inc., 383 F.3d 580, 583 (7th Cir. 2004).
121. Id.
122. Id.
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IV. WHAT THE CURRENT TRENDS MEAN FOR EMPLOYERS AND WHAT
THEY CAN Do ABOUT IT
A. TREND: BOOM IN POTENTIAL EMPLOYER LIABILITY
The litigation of maternal wall cases has resulted in substantial
recoveries and settlements. 123 As of 2005, the Center for WorkLife Law, a
research and advocacy center that seeks to eliminate workplace
discrimination against caregivers, had documented over 600 cases filed
against employers for caregiver discrimination. 124  Although employment
discrimination cases based on race, gender, disability, national origin and
religion typically have only a 20% success rate, maternal wall
discrimination cases have a greater than 50% success rate. 125 Of the cases
the Center for WorkLife Law studied, the mean award was $768,976, and
the median just over $100,000; 54% of these cases settled for over
$100,000, which should concern employers. 126  In Walsh v. National
Computer Systems, Inc., the plaintiff, who complained to her supervisor
that her child suffered too many ear infections, was awarded $625,525.90
after a supervisor threw a phone book at her and told her to find a
pediatrician open after hours. 2 7 In Knussman v. Maryland, a father who
was told that he could not take parental leave "unless [his] wife is in a
coma or dead" was awarded $667,000 in damages and attorneys fees. 28
Another case resulted in an award of $495,000 to a woman who claimed
she was denied tenure because she took maternity leave and that the
employer used institutional policies to slow down the tenure clock.129 In
another case, a maintenance worker was awarded $11.65 million under the
Family and Medical Leave Act after being penalized for taking time off to
care for his elderly parents after twenty-five years of service. 3° A recent
case survived summary judgment and settled quickly when the employer
made comments to his female employee, who had four children, about how
123. Joan C. Williams, Litigating the Glass Ceiling and the Maternal Wall: Using Stereotyping and
Cognitive Bias Evidence to Prove Gender Discrimination, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL'Y J. 287, 292
(2003).
124. MARY C. STILL, LITIGATING THE MATERNAL WALL: U.S LAWSUITS CHARGING
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WORKERS WITH FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES, 7 (2006).
125. Id. at 14.
126. Id. at 15.
127. Walsh v. Nat'l Computer Sys., Inc., 332 F.3d 1150, 1155, 1157 (8th Cir. 2003); see also
Williams, supra note 123, at 292.
128. Knussman v. Md., 272 F.3d 625, 650 n.3 (4th Cir. 2001); see also Williams, supra note 123, at
292.
129. Allison Schneider, U. of Oregon Settles Tenure Lawsuit Over Maternity Leave, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC. (Washington, D.C.), July 21, 2000, at A12.
130. Williams, supra note 123, at 292 (citing Minute Order Recording Jury Verdict, Shultz v.
Advocate Health, No. 01-CV-702 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2002)). The Family and Medical Leave Act is
codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000).
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his wife did not have childcare problems and that she, the employee, should
"do the right thing" and stay home with her children. 13
1
Given the movement toward and the success in the use of stereotyping
evidence in maternal wall cases, it is no longer enough for an employer to
avoid liability by replacing one woman, i.e. a mother, with another woman
who fits a gender-stereotyped "ideal worker" norm, i.e. a women without
children. Employers faces the risk of costly liability and settlements by
operating based on outdated gender stereotypes; they must change with the
times or risk paying enormous judgments.
B. SOLUTIONS FOR A FLEXIBLE WORKPLACE
In light of this trend, it is important for employers to consider
whether their workplaces are sufficiently family-friendly, to cultivate
sensitivity and awareness to caregiver discrimination, and to implement
solutions that are both family-friendly and cost efficient. The importance
of employer training is paramount in preventing lawsuits. Recent case law
shows that employers do not understand the legal ramifications of making
comments such as "I don't see how you can be a good worker and a good
mother," "Don't have a baby if you want to get ahead here," and "Men
make better employees because they don't take time off to have babies." '132
Thus, training should emphasize that personnel decisions should be based
on legitimate business needs and individual performance, and should
cultivate awareness about common biases and stereotypes. 133
The employer should also adopt an anti-discrimination policy with
respect to family responsibilities. Doing so sets expectations for the
organization and reduces or eliminates punitive damages if a lawsuit
occurs.'34 A model policy proposed by the Center for WorkLife Law
suggests that those employers who already have anti-discrimination
policies should amend these to prohibit discrimination based on family
responsibilities. 135  Employers should notify employees of such changes
and incorporate the changes into anti-discrimination and anti-harassment
training sessions for employees. 136  Employers may also create a stand-
131. Joan C. Williams & Cynthia Thomas Calvert, Families Responsibilities Discrimination: What
Plaintiffs'Attorneys, Management Attorneys and Employees Need to Know, 91 WOMEN LAW. J. 24, 24
(2006) (citing Plaetzer v. Borton Automotive, Inc., No. Civ.02-3089, 2004 WL 2066770 (D. Minn.
August 13, 2004)).
132. Williams & Calvert, supra note 132, at 26.
133. Id. at 26-27.
134. Id. at 27.
135. CENTER FOR WORKLIFE LAW, PREVENTING DISCRIMINATION AGAINST EMPLOYEES WITH
FAMILY RESPONSIBILITIES: A MODEL POLICY FOR EMPLOYERS 2 (2006),
http://www.uchastings.edu/site-files/WLL/ModelPolicyforEmployers.pdf.
136. Id.
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alone policy prohibiting discrimination based on family responsibilities.'37
Such a policy emphasizes a company's commitment to eliminating
discrimination. 138  As with amendments to add to current anti-
discrimination policies, employees should be notified about such a policy
and the policy should be incorporated into employee training. 1
39
One study documents the successful implementation of cost-efficient,
family-friendly policies in the following areas: attrition and retention,
recruitment, productivity, absenteeism, and stress-related health costs.
140
1. Attrition & Retention
Flexibility has been shown to be important to both men and women
and is a significant factor in reducing the attrition of experienced women in
the workplace. AstraZeneca, one of the world's leading pharmaceutical
companies, conducted a survey which reported that 61% of men and 80%
of women considered a company's flexible policies in deciding whether to
stay at the company. 141 Deloitte & Touche conducted a survey in the early
1990s to determine what factor was most influential in reducing the large
turnover rate of women.' 42 Deloitte found that the number one factor was
flexibility, and Deloitte implemented policies accordingly.'43 Now, men's
and women's turnover rates are nearly equal, and whereas only fourteen
women were in leadership positions in 1993, there were 168 women in
leadership positions in 2003.'"
Flexibility in the workplace reduces employee attrition and increases
employee retention, which in turn results in business savings. Arlie
Hochschild studied a Fortune 500 company that she referred to as
"Amerco" to protect its anonymity. She found that it cost $40,000 to
replace each skilled employee who quit; other figures suggest that the cost
of replacing a worker is 0.75 to 1.5 times that worker's annual salary.
145
When Deloitte & Touche implemented family-friendly policies, including
instituting measures to control glass-ceiling effects and changing its
policies on flexible work, reduced hours, and telecommuting, the turnover
rates for senior women managers dropped from 25% to 15% in three
137. Id. at 3.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 3-4.
140. ARLENE JOHNSON ET AL., BUSINESS IMPACTS OF FLEXIBILITY: AN IMPERATIVE FOR
EXPANSION 4 (2005), http://www.cvworkingfamilies.org/ (follow "Our Work" link then follow
"Business Impacts of Flexibility: An Imperative for Expansion").
141. Id. at 10.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 88.
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years.146 Deloitte & Touche estimated that it saved $41.5 million in
turnover-related costs in 2003 as a result of these flexible policies.147 When
Helene Curtis' adopted a flextime program, it increased the return rate of
new mothers from 69% to 93% percent in three years, resulting in a savings
of $360,000.14' A recent work/life survey shows that 80% of Accenture
employees say that their ability to manage work and home life roles played
a significant role in their decisions to stay at Accenture' 4 9 A survey done
of 42,000 IBM employees in seventy-nine countries found that work-life
balance is the second biggest factor for decisions to leave IBM; those
employees who experienced a greater work life balance reported greater
job satisfaction and were far less likely to leave IBM. 5 ° A follow-up of
this survey showed that 94% of all managers in IBM reported positive
impacts of the new flexible work policies on the company's "ability to
retain talented professionals."15'
2. Recruitment
The existence of flexible workplace policies also plays a significant
role in the potential employee's decision to accept a job offer. In 2003,
Discovery Communications conducted a global employee survey that
reported that 95% of employees in the U.S. consider the availability of
flexible work arrangements in deciding whether to take a job. 52 Bristol-
Meyers Squibb found that flexible work options are an effective
recruitment tool, as one in five employees hired in the last three years
stated that flexible work policies affected their decision. 53  Women
composed 30% of those who considered the availability of flexible work
options, compared to the 12% of men who considered the same. 4
3. Productivity
Flexible policies also improve productivity in four ways: (1) by
allowing employers to stay open for longer hours with the same number of
employees; (2) by improving staffing during illness or vacations; (3) by
increasing worker loyalty and commitment; and (4) with respect to part-
time schedules, by providing a fresh worker at the point when full-time
workers are slowing down.155 Flexible policies also foster commitment
146. Id. at 89-90.
147. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 141, at 10.
148. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 90.
149. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 141, at 9.
150. Id. at9.
151. Id. at 10.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 10-11.
155. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 92.
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among employees, thereby increasing individual employee productivity.
Research conducted by the Corporate Leadership Council found that a 10%
improvement in commitment can increase an employee's level of effort by
6%, and performance by 2%; highly committed employees perform 20%
higher than non-committed employees.'56 At JP Morgan Chase, of those
employees with a manager sensitive to employees' personal lives, 84%
rated their area's productivity as good or very good, compared to 55% of
employees who did not have a sensitive manager.157
4. Absenteeism
Family-friendly workplace policies reduce absenteeism.1 58  By
allowing flexibility in the workplace, absenteeism may be reduced by as
much as 55%, improving both work quality and morale.'59 Chemical Bank
built an on-site child-care center, resulting in a 60% reduction in
absenteeism and a savings of $2 million. 6 °
5. Stress-Related Health Costs
Stress is costly to employers: the costs of employee illness,
disability, medical expenses, health care, productivity loss, and the need for
replacement total $300 billion per year.'6' Chrysalis Performance
Strategies found that stress is responsible for 19% of absenteeism, 40% of
attrition, 55% of Employee Assistance Program (EAP) costs, 30% of short-
term and long-term disability costs, 10% of coverage for psychotherapeutic
drugs, 60% of total cost of workplace accidents, and 100% of workers'
compensation claims and lawsuits due to stress.'62 Flexibility in the
workplace significantly reduces stress. IBM found that employees who
have flexibility report lower stress levels than those without flexibility.'63
Those reporting reduced stress levels are able to work longer hours, and
can work up to an additional day per week without feeling work-life
stress."64 Employees on flexible arrangements at Bristol-Myers Squibb
reported 30% less stress and burnout.'65 Based on survey information on
the differences in stress levels between those employees who have
flexibility and those who do not, and research about the number of days
lost on average due to stress-related health issues, AstraZeneca designed a
156. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 140, at 13.
157. Id. at21.
158. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 91.
159. Id.
160. Id.
16 1. JOHNSON ET AL., supra note 141, at 14.
162. Id. at 14-15.
163. Id. at 15.
164. Id.
165. Id.
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flexible workplace policy that would result in an estimated multi-million
dollar cost savings.'66
The trend toward the successful use of stereotyping evidence in
maternal wall cases, as seen in Back v. Hastings on Hudson, has made it
easier for plaintiffs to bring successful claims of discrimination and more
expensive for employers to litigate. In order to prevent lawsuits, or at least
to reduce the risk of punitive damages, employers should amend their anti-
discrimination policies to prohibit discrimination against those with
caregiver responsibilities. An employer may also adopt flexible work
policies in order to reduce the incidence of maternal wall lawsuits. Studies
have shown that flexible family-friendly policies have resulted in
significant cost savings for the employer in the areas of attrition and
retention, recruitment, productivity, absenteeism, and stress-related health
costs. Thus, it is in the employer's best interest to make the workplace
more family-friendly.
V. CONCLUSION
The number of married women with childcare responsibilities who
joined the workforce tripled in the last three decades.167 The American
workplace has failed to keep pace with this development and, as a result,
these women face a barrier known as the "maternal wall," defined as
discrimination against working mothers and caregivers that results in their
exclusion from desirable employment.168
Courts saw an increase in maternal wall litigation as a result of this
change in the American workforce. Although it used to be more difficult
for plaintiffs to prevail on claims of maternal wall discrimination in the
past due to strict requirements for comparator evidence, plaintiffs have seen
increased success as courts have relaxed this requirement in favor of a
showing of stereotyping evidence. This has resulted in significant litigation
costs and expensive settlements to employers.
Discriminatory practices and demands on employees based on
outmoded, stereotyped ideals have also resulted in costly employee
turnover. Instead, the employer should consider implementing family-
friendly policies that will reduce such turnover. Examples of such policies
include flextime scheduling, telecommuting, and reduced hours. Indeed,
studies examining the effects of such policies in the workplace show that
they can result in significant cost savings for the employer. In light of this
fact, and in light of the prospect of costly litigation and settlements, it is
increasingly important for employers to be mindful of whether their
166. Id. at 23.
167. Kaminer, supra note 1, at 310.
168. WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 70.
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workplaces are family-friendly and of potential liability for discrimination
against caregivers at work.
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